UMFRVerification infrastructure for private credit
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Eight questions, 31 worked cases, anchored to real public records — including synthetic controls built to test the checks themselves. Each case shows what the engine recomputed and which checks fired; where a figure is clickable, it opens the source it came from.

UMFR VERIFY

Double-pledged collateral: collateral pledged beyond its value

Curated demo — real public records

Is the same collateral pledged twice? (the REGISTER thesis)

This is what a shared record across lenders would catch once it exists, shown on public cases; it is not live (that needs design-partner tapes; borrower identifiers are stripped from public data under SEC Release 33-9638).

What this report claimsHolds through L3 — Cross-Referenced
  1. 1Document present
  2. 2Data Extracted
  3. 3Cross-Referenced
  4. 4Checks cleared
  5. 5No exception surfaced

does not hold — something surfaced for review this lens does not screen here

L1 and L2 hold for any document; L3 to L5 depend on what this case's own artifacts show

What UMFR claims and does not claim, row by row
L1

Document present

Claims: The public filing is held as a committed copy and identified by type; its SHA-256 is recorded.

Does not claim: Does not claim the document is authentic or complete.

Liability: None beyond the copy.

(baseline for any ingested document (precomputed demo fixture))

L2

Data Extracted

Claims: These values were extracted from the document text by the pipeline, each carrying a source page and quote.

Does not claim: Does not claim the values are correct or the document truthful.

Liability: Extraction quality only.

(baseline — extracted / committed data present)

L3

Cross-Referenced

Claims: The extracted data is consistent across the documents provided and passes the internal recompute / reconciliation checks that ran.

Does not claim: Does not claim the underlying business reality matches the documents.

Liability: Cross-reference accuracy.

L4

Checks cleared

Claims: No rule-based duplicate-pledge, fabrication or arithmetic check fired on the data supplied; each check that ran is named, and each that could not run is named with its reason.

Does not claim: Does not claim the absence of sophisticated fabrication that the data patterns may not surface.

Liability: Methodology, not outcomes.

(anomaly surfaced — not cleared (verdict: critical))

L5

No exception surfaced

Claims: Each check that ran surfaced no exception. Checks that could not run are named with their reason; an inferred figure is derived by a stated rule, not read from a filed figure.

Does not claim: Does not claim investment suitability and does not constitute advice.

Liability: See Disclaimer.

not assessed(a cross-document reconciliation verdict)

Boundary: v1 public-data screening. Anchored to the public record (DOJ indictment, Ch.7 filing) — NOT raw UCC filings. Named parties and the ~$1.4B/$2.2B magnitudes are documented public facts; the per-lender allocation is illustrative. A lien-level red flag corroborated by public facts — NOT independent verification of the per-instrument double-pledge (that is v3, private cross-lender data).

Cross-document collateral reconciliation

Cross-lender double-pledge: the same auto-loan and vehicle collateral pool pledged to three secured parties, summing beyond its value.

Tricolor Holdings (Ch.7, Sept 2025) held ~$1.4B of real auto-loan/vehicle collateral but pledged ~$2.2B to multiple financing sources (a ~$800M shortfall), per the DOJ indictment of its CEO and COO. Documented lenders include JPMorgan Chase, Fifth Third Bancorp, and Barclays.

Public-record corroboration — allegation, not adjudicated

DOJ / trustee corroboration (allegation, not adjudicated): The superseding indictment (US v. Chu et al., SDNY) alleges that Tricolor pledged the same collateral pool — roughly 29,000 auto loans — to more than one financing source, reconstructing ~$2.2B pledged against ~$1.4B of real collateral (a ~$800M shortfall). Trustee counsel described the same over-pledge in the Chapter 7 proceeding. JPMorgan Chase and Fifth Third each disclosed a Tricolor-related charge-off; no per-lender amount is stated here. The ~29,000-loan figure is DOJ-alleged pool composition — a corroboration anchor for the aggregate direction, NOT a per-loan or per-VIN tie-out. This remains v1 public-data screening: an allegation corroborated on the public record, not independent verification of the per-instrument double-pledge.

Verdict: CRITICAL1 exception: collateral pledged beyond its value, by 10% or more of that value (this report's own severity)— a screen, not a score

Collateral pledged to multiple lenders beyond its value

CRITICAL (this report's own severity): collateral pledged beyond its value, by 10% or more of that value

The Tricolor auto-loan and vehicle collateral pool is pledged to 3 lenders (JPMorgan Chase, Fifth Third, Barclays) totaling $2.2B against a value of $1.4B; over-pledged by $800M.

asset value
$1.40B
total pledged
$2.20B
over-pledge
$800.0M
Evidence:

Per-rule and per-severity discrepancy totals are NOT additive: a single pool can carry overlapping discrepancies across rules (e.g. an availability overstatement and a cross-aging discrepancy), so summing them would overstate the amount at risk.

Source: public record

Each citation is a named public source — never a raw UCC filing

Pledge — asserting party
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
Per-party amount is illustrative of the documented aggregate; role shown, not a sourced per-party figure.
Cited public source
US v. Chu et al., SDNY (DOJ), 2025
Open source
What the record documents

Per the DOJ indictment, Tricolor pledged the same auto-loan/vehicle collateral to multiple financing sources, totaling ~$2.2B against ~$1.4B of real collateral. JPMorgan Chase is a documented lender (DOJ). Per-lender allocation is illustrative of the documented ~$2.2B aggregate.

Provenance: real-anchored-curated@demonstration. Per-lender allocation is illustrative of the documented aggregate; this is a red flag corroborated by the public record, not an independent verification from primary filings.

What we don’t claim

  • Within a pool, not across lenders — borrower identifiers are stripped from public data under SEC Release 33-9638, so cross-lender matching isn’t possible here, and we don’t pretend otherwise.
  • The $68.1B map covers public filers and shows the disclosure category implicated in the First Brands collapse — it is not a ‘First Brands detector’; First Brands was private and never filed with the SEC.
  • Findings are exceptions for review, never accusations.
  • UMFR checks whether reported figures reconcile to the source documents. It does not rate credit, predict default, or recommend investment.
  • Deterministic in the output. Read from source or computed from it. No model decides a number.

What it shows on a public filing

UMFR is pre-seed, building with a small number of design partners. If you lend in private credit or invest in the infrastructure, talk to the founder.